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CANADIAN MANUFACTURING
MALAISE: THREE HYPOTHESES  
Matt Krzepkowski and Jack Mintz†
SUMMARY
The danger in politicians promoting the idea that “Dutch Disease” is responsible for the
decline of the Ontario manufacturing sector is that the suggestion implies that Canada’s
manufacturing sector will bounce back if only we could slow down oil sands development, or
if the Canadian dollar were to devalue. In reality, evidence suggests that the decline in Ontario
manufacturing is the result of long-term structural changes in the economy, independent of
the rise of the country’s natural-resource sector and the rising dollar. And the sooner policy-
makers realize that, and stop blaming the decline in manufacturing on Dutch Disease (which
holds that a booming natural-resource sector that drives up our dollar makes our
manufacturing exports less competitive) the sooner they can get to work on helping
manufacturing-dependent regions transition to the evolving economy.
A closer analysis of Canada’s manufacturing sector shows that jobs in that sector have been
disappearing across the country since the end of the Second World War, with the sector’s
share of employment falling dramatically well before rapid development began to take hold in
the oil sands, and back when Canada’s dollar was still worth far less than the American dollar.
It is a trend that has been occurring among most of our OECD peers, including the United
States, which may be due to the widespread reallocation of production to lower cost countries.
But it is also true that Canada’s manufacturing productivity performance in particular has
been declining for a generation, with especially poor performance in the last decade, when
labour productivity in Canada grew at just a quarter of the U.S. rate. Meanwhile, capital
investment that may have improved the competitiveness of Canadian manufacturing has been
anemic.  
Yet there is no particular reason to lament the scaling-down of manufacturing jobs in Ontario.
The province remains just as economically important, as a share of national GDP, as it was 30
years ago, and its unemployment rate has remained roughly in line with the Canadian average.
Often the manufacturing jobs that disappear soonest are low-skill, low-paying jobs. Indeed,
those workers that have remained in the sector have done very well, with the growth in weekly
earnings in the Ontario manufacturing sector outpacing the national average.
It would be a grave mistake for Ontario’s policy-makers to argue in favour of hampering
Canada’s oil sands development in hopes that it might devalue the dollar and revive their
province’s shrinking manufacturing base. It would harm the national economy and yet, judging
by the evidence, may do nothing to add jobs at Ontario’s factories. Instead, Ontario’s policy-
makers should accept that those jobs might never return, and instead, focus their energies on
finding ways to encourage growth in high-skill, high-paying jobs in other sectors that offer more
promise. 
† We wish to thank two anonymous referees whose comments helped substantially improve this paper. 
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MALAISE DANS LE SECTEUR 
MANUFACTURIER CANADIEN :  
TROIS HYPOTHÈSES
Matt Krzepkowski et Jack Mintz†
RÉSUMÉ
Quand certains politiciens soutiennent que le « mal hollandais » constitue la cause du déclin du secteur manufacturier 
en Ontario, on pourrait comprendre à tort que ce secteur au Canada renaîtrait de ses cendres si seulement nous 
pouvions ralentir le développement des sables bitumineux ou si le dollar canadien perdait de sa valeur. En réalité, 
les études démontrent que le déclin de ce secteur en Ontario résulte de changements structuraux à long terme 
dans l'économie, sans lien avec la place grandissante du secteur des ressources naturelles du pays ou avec la force 
du dollar. Et plus les décideurs seront prompts à se rendre compte de la situation et à cesser d’imputer au « mal 
hollandais » (qui soutient qu’une industrie des ressources naturelles florissante poussant à la hausse la valeur du 
dollar sape la compétitivité des exportations) le déclin du secteur manufacturier, plus tôt ils pourront se mettre à 
l'œuvre pour aider les régions qui dépendent de celui-ci à prendre le virage d’une économie en évolution.
Une analyse plus attentive indique que les emplois dans le secteur manufacturier ont commencé à disparaître au 
pays depuis la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale; leur nombre a chuté brutalement bien avant que s'amorce pour 
de bon le développement des sables bitumineux, et au moment où le dollar canadien valait encore beaucoup moins 
que le dollar américain. Cette tendance s'observe dans la plupart des pays de l'OCDE, notamment aux États-Unis, et 
elle est peut-être attribuable au déplacement à grande échelle de la production vers des pays où la fabrication était 
moins coûteuse.
Mais il est également vrai que le rendement du secteur manufacturier au Canada en particulier est à la baisse depuis 
une génération et qu'il a été particulièrement faible au cours de la dernière décennie tandis que la productivité du 
travail dans le pays croissait au quart, tout au plus, de celle des États-Unis. Entre-temps, l'investissement en capital 
qui aurait pu améliorer la compétitivité de cette industrie au Canada a été anémique.
Il n'existe pourtant aucune raison particulière de déplorer la perte graduelle des emplois dans ce secteur en 
Ontario. La province continue d'avoir le même poids économique qu'il y a 30 ans quant à sa part du PIB, et son 
taux de chômage est demeuré sensiblement le même que dans le reste du Canada. Bien souvent, les emplois qui 
disparaissent les premiers dans le secteur manufacturier sont ceux qui sont peu qualifiés et mal payés. Il est clair que 
les travailleurs qui sont restés ont eu la part belle, car la croissance de leurs salaires hebdomadaires en Ontario a été 
plus rapide que dans le reste du pays.
Les décideurs de l'Ontario commettraient une grave erreur en prenant le parti de freiner le développement des 
sables bitumineux du Canada dans l'espoir de pousser à la baisse le dollar canadien et de ranimer le secteur de la 
fabrication de plus en plus exsangue. Cela nuirait à l'économie nationale sans pour autant créer d'emplois dans les 
usines de l'Ontario, selon différentes études. Les décideurs de l'Ontario devraient plutôt admettre que ces emplois 
ont disparu pour de bon et concentrer leurs énergies sur des façons d'encourager la croissance d’emplois hautement 
qualifiés et bien rémunérés dans d'autres secteurs plus prometteurs.
† 
Nous souhaitons remercier deux lecteurs anonymes dont les commentaires ont substantiellement contribué à améliorer cet 
article.
INTRODUCTION
Canadian politicians have debated what role “Dutch Disease” has had as a source of Canadian
manufacturing decline, focusing on the development of the Canadian resource sector, and most
notably Alberta’s oil sands, and the subsequent effect on the Canadian dollar and manufacturing.
Under the “Dutch Disease” hypothesis, it is argued that a boom in the resource sector crowds
out the manufacturing industry as a result of an appreciating currency that makes manufacturing
less competitive internationally.
Yet there are other competing hypotheses that can explain the decline of Canadian
manufacturing. Two in particular come to mind: poor productivity performance and the shift of
manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries. In this briefing paper, we consider all three
hypotheses to explain the decline of manufacturing. 
While the recent run up in both commodity prices and the exchange rate had some impact in
reducing manufacturing jobs, we come to the conclusion that the role of Dutch Disease in
explaining the overall decline of manufacturing is overblown.1 A much more important long-run
explanation holds for the continuing decline in the manufacturing sector in Canada in the past
half-century. This decline is not much different than what has been happening in most other
OECD countries. For this reason, other factors explaining the decline in manufacturing need to
be more carefully examined, rather than focusing on shorter-term impacts of exchange-rate
movements. 
THE DUTCH DISEASE ARGUMENT 
Dutch Disease is named in reference to the decline of the manufacturing sector in the
Netherlands following the exploitation of newly found natural resources in the 1960s. The
development of the resource industry leads to a capital inflow and higher exports, resulting in an
appreciation of the currency, thereby squeezing out other export industries such as
manufacturing.
In Canada, the Dutch Disease argument is being popularly applied to the development of the oil-
sands industry in Alberta and the decline of manufacturing, although in principle could be linked
to the growth of the natural-resource economy in general. In the past decade, the nominal
commodity share of mining and agricultural products has increased, but has fallen for forestry
and natural gas. 
Nonetheless, without question, the growth of the crude-oil share has dominated in determining
the commodity price index.2
1 This point was made by Jack M. Mintz in “No Dutch Disease Here,” Financial Post, March 2, 2012 and Mark Carney,
“Remarks” at the Spruce Meadows Roundtable, 2012, found at Bank of International Settlements,
http://www.bis.org/review/r120910b.pdf.
2 Bank of Canada, 2012, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/price-indexes/bcpi/.
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Even then, one can be confused as to whether the value of production has been due to new
production or to higher commodity prices. For example, while petroleum production has grown
8.9 per cent from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 20113, West Texas Intermediate prices
have increased by almost two-thirds (with substantial volatility during that period). In contrast,
shale-gas development arising from new fracking technologies has led to lower, not higher
prices for natural gas in North America, with the Henry hub price falling from roughly $9 per
million cubic feet in 2008 to less than $4 by the end of 2011 (total natural-gas production in
Canada declined from 2008 to 2011). Expanded shale-gas development is entirely different,
since lower North American natural-gas prices encourage energy-using manufacturing
industries to expand.
Therefore, we focus on internationally determined high energy prices as the primary source of
“Dutch Disease.” Linking high energy prices and manufacturing decline relies on the
connection between three stylized facts: over the last decade, energy prices have soared; the
Canadian dollar has appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 50 per cent since 2000; and the
employment share of manufacturing has fallen in Ontario, Quebec, and the rest of Canada. 
Several recent papers have looked at the extent of this phenomenon in the Canadian context. A
paper published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy used a two-stage procedure with
disaggregated data from 1992 to 2007 in an analysis of the effect of energy prices on
manufacturing output in the past decade.4 The authors found that 25 of 80 industries,
accounting for one quarter of manufacturing output, were negatively affected by the estimated
effect of energy prices on currency appreciation. They found the magnitude of this effect to be
rather small in larger industries, such as food, metals and machinery equipment, with an
average elasticity measure of between -0.07 and -0.16, indicating that a one per cent increase in
energy prices would lower output by between 0.07 to 0.16 per cent. Several small industries,
including textiles and apparel, were more affected by the increase in energy prices.
Though Canada has strong natural resource and energy sectors, a number of factors have
affected the price of the Canadian dollar, not the least of which has been the decline of the U.S.
dollar. Beine, Bos and Coulombe5 isolate the effect of Canadian dollar appreciation and U.S.
dollar depreciation from 2002 to 2007. They estimate that 42 per cent of the increase in the
Canadian dollar was due to an appreciation in the Canadian currency generally, with the U.S.
dollar’s depreciation relative to its trading partners explaining the remainder. Overall, they
estimate 24 per cent of manufacturing employment losses between 2002 and 2007 were due to
the appreciation of the Canadian dollar, as opposed to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar (62
per cent) or long-term structural decline (14 per cent). 
Although the authors show this effect to be more pronounced in trade-exposed industries, it is
not the whole story of how manufacturing as a whole is affected by energy developments.
Given linkages in the domestic economy between resource and manufacturing sectors, a focus
on both domestically exposed and trade-exposed sectors is important to consider as well. 
3 National Energy Board, Canadian Energy Overview, 2011, https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/nrgyvrvw/cndnnrgyvrvw2011/cndnnrgyvrvw2011-eng.html. 
4 Mohammad Shakeri, Richard S. Gray and Jeremy Leonard, “Dutch Disease of Failure to Compete?” IRPP Study No.
30, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2012.
5 Michael Beine, Charles S. Bos and Serge Coulombe “Does the Canadian Economy Suffer From Dutch Disease?”
Resource and Energy Economics 34, 4 (2012): 468-92.
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3The evidence of the impact of high energy prices on manufacturing has concentrated on the
large jobs losses in Ontario manufacturing over the last decade, which fell as a share of total
employment from 18 per cent in 2000 to 11.5 per cent in 2011. This attention on a relatively
short time period results in a stronger correlation between energy prices and falling
employment. The decline in manufacturing jobs has been steady across Canada since the end
of the Second World War. Though it leveled off during the mid-1980s, the manufacturing share
of employment fell from 23 per cent in 1970 to 14 per cent in 1995, before declining to the
current national rate of 11 per cent.6
A similar trend can be seen south of the border in the United States (Figure 1), taking a period
of 20 years rather than only the past decade. Although the volatility in the Canadian dollar in
the 1990s and 2000s helps explain shifting trends in Ontario, overall manufacturing
employment has seen a similar pattern in key states such as Ohio and Michigan, which had
relied heavily on the sector for economic growth since 1990. If much of the rise in Canada’s
currency valuation has been due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, we would expect to see
less of a fall in American manufacturing employment, as they would rely more heavily on their
own production. But as the following chart shows, this has not been the case, with the decline
in manufacturing employment mirrored across the border.
FIGURE 1: PER CENT OF JOBS IN MANUFACTURING
Sources: Statistics Canada, Cansim Table 282-0008; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labour Statistics.
It would be difficult to argue that manufacturing job losses in Michigan and Ohio are a result
of the Dutch Disease phenomenon. True, manufacturing jobs as a share of total employment in
Canada did rise in the 1990s relative to what occurred in the United States, and began to fall
when Canada’s currency appreciated. But overall, the long-run pattern of manufacturing job
losses in both Canada and the United States are similar, suggesting that a much stronger factor
than commodity price effects explains the historical trends.
6 OECD Structural Analysis Database (STAN), 2013.
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Attributing the decline in manufacturing to the energy boom or to a high Canadian dollar has
the underlying assumption that growth in the manufacturing sector may revive after the energy
boom is finished. The problem with this line of thought is that it might not focus on the right
question if there are other factors that are important in explaining the structural decline in
manufacturing. This will only delay the inevitable restructuring of the economy.
PRODUCTIVITY AND MANUFACTURING DECLINE
The decline in manufacturing relative to the rest of the economy could be explained by poor
economic performance in terms of productivity. If firms do not sufficiently invest in capital and
adopt new innovations, they cannot increase output per worker and drive unit costs of
production down to where they can outperform foreign competitors. Manufacturing value-
added as a portion of GDP could therefore decline if manufacturing productivity is growing
slower than the rest of the economy.
This has been the case for Canadian manufacturing. As shown in Figure 2, the manufacturing
sector’s value-added share of GDP has fallen, similar to, but not as rapid as, manufacturing’s
share of employment. In 1970, value-added in manufacturing was close to 20 per cent of GDP,
falling to 16 per cent by 1992, rising to 18 per cent by 2000 and falling precipitously to about
13 per cent in 2011. 
FIGURE 2: CANADIAN MANUFACTURING VALUE-ADDED AS A SHARE OF GDP AND THE CANADA-US EXCHANGE RATE
Source: Statistics Canada, tables 379-0004(GDP) and 176-0064 (exchange rate).
The increase in Canada’s manufacturing value-added during the 1990s out-performed most of
the OECD countries, with Canada increasing its worldwide export share, and may have been
caused by the strength of the U.S. economy during that time.7
7 Dirk Pilat, Agnès Cimper, Karsten Olsen and Colin Webb, “The Changing Nature of Manufacturing in OECD
Economies,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper 2006 No. 9, Paris, 2006.
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Two particular shocks have affected manufacturing in the past decade. As noted, the currency
appreciated after 2002 to levels similar to the period prior to 1975, which led to falling sales
and higher unit costs, due to shrinking scale. Further, the high-tech boom had burst in 2000,
thereby affecting innovative capacity and the adoption of new technologies. 
A Statistics Canada study suggests manufacturing labour productivity performance has been
particularly poor in the past decade. In the 2000 to 2007 period, manufacturing labour
productivity grew at roughly 1.2 per cent in Canada but it grew almost four times faster in the
United States.8 Labour productivity in Canadian manufacturing declined from the previous
three decades. 
Two factors explain labour productivity: capital deepening and multi-factor productivity.
Capital-deepening results from investment in machinery, structures and other forms of capital
that increase the ability of businesses to grow output relative to the growth in labour inputs.
Multi-factor productivity is growth of output due to innovation and entrepreneurship in excess
of the growth in capital and labour inputs.
With respect to capital deepening, investment by manufacturing industries has been anemic,
thereby leading to slower labour productivity growth. In the past 30 years, Canadian
investment in manufacturing as a share of total private investment (Figure 3) has declined from
20 per cent in 1980 to 10 per cent in 2011, with an even stronger decline in Ontario (from over
30 per cent to 10 percent) — although the most significant decline was during the 1980s when
oil prices were low. 
FIGURE 3: MANUFACTURING SHARE OF TOTAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Source: Statistics Canada. CANSIM Table 031-0002 
8 John Baldwin and Wulong Gu, “Productivity Performance in Canada: 1961 to 2008: An Update on Long-Term
Trends,” The Canadian Productivity Review, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, 2009.
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Statistics Canada also estimates that multi-factor productivity has been poor as well, including
during the past decade. However, in a recent study, Diewert and Yu9 estimate that multi-factor
productivity for all industries has grown by 1.03 per cent annually during the 1961 to 2011
period, much higher than the annual 0.28 per cent estimated by Statistics Canada. The most
important difference in estimates is with respect to growth in capital services. Diewert and Yu
estimate lower capital growth and, therefore, higher multi-factor productivity compared to
Statistics Canada estimates. Although there are several factors explaining these differences,
much of the debate arises from the difficulty in estimating capital services needed to measure
capital growth, due to difficult-to-measure values such as expected capital gains, effective tax
rates on capital, and financial cost of capital. Although it is a more important concept in
capturing innovation, multi-factor productivity is quite problematic to estimate precisely.
Nonetheless, even Diewert and Yu estimate poor multi-factor productivity for the Canadian
economy in the past decade.  However, their results apply to all industries and not just
manufacturing.
An appreciation in the Canadian dollar may itself have an effect on changes in productivity.
Multi-factor productivity may fall if exporting industries are unable to take advantage of
returns to scale of production or export intensity, and will therefore see a drop in efficiency.
However, a strong dollar should also cause an increase in capital intensity, as decreasing capital
input costs and higher relative labour costs should encourage additional investment. That an
increase in capital investment in manufacturing does not seem to have materialized is cause for
some concern.
GLOBALIZATION TRENDS AND MANUFACTURING
A diminishing reliance on manufacturing is not a trait common only to one province, Canada
as a whole, or even North America. Employment in manufacturing has been falling over the
last 35 years throughout most of the OECD countries.10 Since 1975, the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany and France, have had their manufacturing employment share drop even
more than Canada’s has. 
The drop in employment in manufacturing can be seen in Figure 4 below. In 2005, Canada has
slightly more manufacturing as a share of total employment than in the United States and the
United Kingdom, and less than in France and Germany, but there is a marked decline in each
of these developed nations by an average of over 10 per cent.
9 Erwin Diewert and Emily Yu, “New Estimates of Real Income and Multifactor Productivity Growth for the Canadian
Business Sector, 1961-2011,” International Productivity Monitor, 24 (2012): 27-48. See also in the same volume:
Wolong Gu, “Estimating Capital Input for Measuring Business Sector Multi-factor Productivity Growth in Canada:
Response to Diewert and Yu,” International Productivity Monitor, 24 (2012): 49-62.
10 Mexico and Turkey have gained, but recent data is only compared to data from 1995. The employment share in
manufacturing in Korea rose from 1970 to 1985, but has also been in decline since then.
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FIGURE 4: MANUFACTURING SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
Source: OECD Structural Analysis Database (STAN), 2013.
This decline in manufacturing has been noted since the 1980s and is not specific to countries
with large natural resources that may have been susceptible to Dutch Disease, but is apparent
in a wide range of countries. These trends might reflect the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs
to low-wage countries. Alternatively, the adoption of new technologies throughout the world
could have led to a decline in unskilled jobs in manufacturing.  A more careful analysis would
be needed to understand these trends.11
Many originally viewed the shift from employment in industrial manufacturing to services as a
concern, yet there is little evidence this shift has a negative effect on economic growth overall.
Much of these shifts occur during recessions. Manufacturing and manual labour jobs are
hardest hit during economic downturns, with automated processes replacing jobs, and the jobs,
therefore, not returning with the economic recovery.12 Low-wage jobs are particularly affected.
Coupled with increased competition between other sectors, particularly the oil and gas and
technology sectors, these changes have been beneficial to employees who have remained in the
manufacturing sector. Median weekly earnings in the Ontario manufacturing sector have
increased in step with jobs in other sectors, going from $704 in 2001 to $840 in 2011, still
above the national average.13
11 An OECD study looked at the effect of outsourcing on manufacturing employment, but focused on the time period
1995-2002, where Canada actually experienced growth in manufacturing. See OECD, Offshoring and Employment:
Trends and Impacts, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2007. A study by Industry Canada suggests that both outsourcing and
the adoption of information technologies have had significant impacts on the adoption of skills in the manufacturing
sector.  See Beiling Yan, “The Demand for Skills in Canada: the Role of Foreign Outsourcing and Information-
Communication Technology,” Canadian Journal of Economics 39, 1 (2006): 53-67.
12 Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu, “The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polarization and Jobless Recoveries,” NBER Working
Paper No. 18334, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.
13 Statistics Canada, Table 282-0072: Labour force survey estimates (LFS), wages of employees by type of work, North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
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Even though manufacturing has declined in Ontario, as a province it remains as economically
important today as it was 30 years ago, with Ontario’s share of national GDP remaining around
39 per cent, the same as in the early 1990s — though it should be noted that its share of
population has increased.14 The overall unemployment rate in Ontario was until recently
slightly below the Canadian average, and now lies slightly above, at 7.8 per cent compared to
the national 7.2 per cent.15 
Ontario has seen a shift from manufacturing to finance, high-tech and other industries. These
changes reflect the changing structure of the Ontario economy, away from manufacturing,
which is not an unusual phenomenon in most OECD countries.
CONCLUSIONS
Casting blame for lost manufacturing jobs on commodity prices ignores the inevitable fact that,
even if the dollar begins to fall, it is unlikely that those lost jobs will return. Ontario should
focus its economic policies on encouraging growth in high-skill, high-paying jobs in various
industries, including high-tech, finance and business services, instead of competing for
manufacturing jobs, especially low-skilled ones. 
Policies should not attempt to slow down expanding industries, but should focus on revitalizing
industries and regions hit by high unemployment and slow growth. Attempting to protect
domestic industries from foreign competition results in higher prices for consumers. Further,
protecting certain domestic industries from competition within our borders will not only
increase domestic prices of domestic goods and imports, but will also hurt wages of workers
and economic growth. At a time where the world is attempting to recover from a serious
economic recession, having a strong resource sector can be a blessing, not a curse. 
14 Statistics Canada, Table 384-0002: Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-based, provincial economic accounts,
annual (dollars).
15 Statistics Canada, Table 282-0008: Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS), sex and age group, annual (persons unless otherwise noted).
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EXPORT PIPELINES AND PROVINCIAL RIGHTS: HOW BEST TO GET TO THE WEST COAST AND ASIAN
MARKETS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/export-pipelines-and-provincial-rights-how-best-get-west-coast-
and-asian-markets
F.L. (Ted) Morton | February 2013
PACIFIC BASIN HEAVY OIL REFINING CAPACITY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/pacific-basin-heavy-oil-refining-capacity
D. Hackett, L. Noda, S. Grissom, M.C. Moore and J. Winter | February 2013
SOVEREIGN WEALTH AND PENSION FUNDS CONTROLLING CANADIAN BUSINESSES: TAX-POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/sovereign-wealth-and-pension-funds-controlling-canadian-
businesses-tax -policy-implications
Vijay Jog and Jack Mintz | February 2013
LABOUR SHORTAGES IN SASKATCHEWAN
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/labour-shortages-saskatchewan
J.C. Herbert Emery | January 2013
TAX LOSS UTILIZATION AND CORPORATE GROUPS: A POLICY CONUNDRUM
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/tax-loss-utilization-and-corporate-groups-policy-conundrum
Stephen R. Richardson and Michael Smart | January 2013
A PRIMER ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA'S BUDGET
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/primer-government-albertas-budget
Ron Kneebone | January 2013
PROGRESSIVE INCREMENTALISM: U.S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/progressive-incrementalism-us-foreign-economic-policy-over-next-
four-years
John M. Curtis | January 2013
INSTRUMENTS FOR FOREST HABITAT CONNECTIVITY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/instruments-forest-habitat-connectivity
Elizabeth A. Wilman | January 2013
THE SYRIAN CRISIS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WORLD; IS THERE A ROLE FOR CANADA?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/syrian-crisis-what-it-means-world-there-role-canada
Ferry de Kerckhove | December 2012
